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Abstract 
 
Hardware Trojans have become a significant threat to ICs/SoCs used in defense or other 
security critical applications. This threat is becoming more prominent because majority of 
the chip design companies rely upon third parties for fabricating their design. This is due 
to the higher fabrication costs involved as the technology node is shrinking. This leads to 
Fabrication-time attacks since an adversary at the untrusted fabrication house can make 
malicious modifications to the design. This may lead to reduced lifecycle of a chip, leaking 
out secret information et cetera. While there is a diverse set of Hardware Trojans 
available, we need the Trojan to be as stealthy as possible, having a smaller area, causing 
minimal perturbations to the existing design in terms of power, temperature & delay, and 
having a complex triggering mechanism. In this paper, we will study one such Hardware 
Trojan attack. Detecting Hardware Trojans is very challenging due to the diversity of 
Trojans. We would also look at different ways in which a Trojan attack can be detected. 
Then, we would evaluate if any of those defenses can detect our example attack. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
The technology node for IC’s is shrinking to deep submicron levels and while this has 
been a boon for the performance, the complexity and cost of fabricating these ICs is 
increasing dramatically.  According to data available online[1], it costs about 15% more 
to set up the fabrication lab for each successive process node. Due to the high costs 
involved, most of the chip design companies do not opt for an in-house fabrication. 
Instead, a lot of design houses are becoming fabless i.e. they outsource the fabrication 
of their IC’s and rely upon a third party to fabricate their design. This gives opportunities 
to the attackers to make malicious modifications to the original design, known as 
Hardware Trojans. These Trojans pose a serious threat to security critical applications by 
causing chip malfunctions, reducing the reliability/lifetime of the ICs, leak out secret 
information to the attackers. HTs can be inserted into a design at any phase from RTL 
Design to Fabrication. Figure 1[2] below depicts different phases in the IC design cycle 
where a Trojan can be inserted by rogue engineers.  Depending upon the phase where 
Trojan is inserted, the attack can be categorized as a Design Time Attack or a Fabrication 
Time Attack. The likelihood of a Fabrication time attack being detected is relatively less 
since it has to go through a fewer verification stages, namely, Post-Fabrication Testing 
as compared to the Design Time attacks. Therefore, in this paper, we would be focusing 
upon Fabrication time attacks.  
 
Figure 1. 1 
Different phases in IC Design Cycle where a HT can be inserted 
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One of the well-known fabrication time attack is the Dopant-Level Trojan[3],[4]. These 
dopant-level trojans make the existing circuitry malicious by identifying the victim 
transistors and changing the dopant ratio on the input pins. They tie the input of the victim 
transistors to a logic 0 (Open Circuit) or Logic 1 (Short Circuit). These trojans are very 
hard to detect since they modify the existing circuitry and do not introduce any additional 
circuitry. To detect dopant-level trojans, a complete chip delayering and comprehensive 
imaging with a scanning electron microscope has to be done. But there is a trade-off 
between this elusiveness and the expressiveness of dopant-level trojans. Since, dopant 
level trojans do not have a sophisticated trigger, they are more detectable by post-
fabrication testing. Therefore, we need a HT attack which is controllable, stealthy and 
small. In this paper, we would discuss about one such attack which requires as little as 
one gate in a sea of millions of gates, has a sophisticated trigger and has negligible 
perturbations on the original design in terms of area, power and delay. The attack works 
by sucking out charge from a victim wire every time it transitions and storing that charge 
on a capacitor. When the voltage across the capacitor becomes more than a threshold 
value, payload is deployed - which is changing the value of a victim flip-flop to any desired 
value.  
To defend against Hardware Trojan attacks, researchers have proposed different 
methods like 1) using side channel information[5],[6](power, temperature, delay) to check 
for anomalous behavior, 2) adding on-chip sensors[7] to measure features like signal 
propagation delay, temperature changes and check if there are any dramatic changes in 
those features, 3) Split Manufacturing[8], 4) Addition of Built-In Self Authentication cells 
instead of non-functional filler cells[9]. These defense techniques will be explained further 
in the paper. We would then evaluate which of the defense techniques are capable of 
detecting our example attack and which ones are not. Lastly, we would review the 
strengths and shortcomings of our example attack. 
Rest of the paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents Hardware Trojan Overview 
and the Example Attack. In Chapter 3, we will discuss the Possible Defenses against the 
Hardware Trojans. In Chapter 4, we will check if our defenses are capable of detecting 
the HT in Example Attack. Chapter 5 will cover the strengths and shortcomings of our 
Example Attack. Finally, Chapter 6 will conclude the paper. 
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Chapter 2.  Hardware Trojan Overview 
 
2.1 What is a Hardware Trojan? 
Hardware Trojan is any addition or modification to a circuit or a system with malicious 
intention. Hardware Trojans are persistent i.e. once a system has been infected, the 
threat remains every time the system is turned on. They have the potential ability to 
undermine confidence in all modern electronic systems. 
2.2 Characteristics of a Hardware Trojan 
1. Change or control the functionality of an Integrated Circuit(IC) or a System on 
Chip(SoC), for example changing the logic value of a security critical flipflop that 
has some serious implications. 
2. A Hardware Trojan can assist in leaking sensitive information, for example by 
propagating internal signals to the output pins. These signals can disclose secret 
information to attackers. 
3. Reduce Circuit Reliability, for example by introducing additional circuitry that is 
capable of creating local temperature hotspots in the IC and thereby, causing the 
chip to fail eventually. 
2.3 Building Blocks of Hardware Trojans 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. 1 HT Building Blocks 
2.3.1 Trigger A Trigger is some circuitry that activates the attack. 
 
Figure 2. 2 Trigger Circuit 
Characteristics of a good Trigger Circuit: 
1. Small Area: The trigger circuit should be small enough so that it has better 
chances of escaping detection. For example, it should be small enough so that it 
can fit into the empty spaces left after the placement and routing of any design. 
2. Functionality: The trigger circuit must be able to detect the toggling events of a 
target victim wire, serving as an input to the trigger circuit. 
Hardware Trojan 
Trigger  Payload  
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3. Low Power: Since trigger circuit is an additional circuitry, it should have low power 
consumption which can be well hidden within the normal fluctuations of entire 
chip’s power consumption. 
4. Negligible Timing Perturbation: The trigger circuit should not impact the existing 
path delays in the original design by a huge amount. The timing perturbations 
should not be easily separable from the noise common to the path delays.   
5. Standard Cell Compatibility: The trigger circuit must be able to fit within the 
standard cell dimensions. 
2.3.2 Payload A Payload is the actual action performed by the attack. For example, it 
might be changing the logical value of a security critical register or it can be dramatically 
increasing the temperature consumption of the entire chip. 
2.4 Example Attack 
In this attack[2], analog characteristics of integrated circuits are leveraged to 
implement the trigger. The attacker uses the Graphic Database System II (GDSII) file, 
which is a polygon representation of already placed and routed design. By doing some 
preprocessing steps, the attacker identifies the location of unused spaces in the laid-out 
design. These unused spaces are then used to fit in the Trojan circuitry, which includes 
the trigger and the payload. Assumption here is that these unused spaces are filled with 
dummy logic, also called as non-functional Filler cells. Removing these filler cells won’t 
impact the functionality of the design. 
This attack is a privilege escalation attack. Once the trigger circuit is activated, the 
payload is deployed. Here, payload is to change the privilege bit of a processor which 
escalates the privilege of a User Mode process to Supervisor Mode. This gives the 
attacker full control over the processor. 
2.4.1 Trigger Circuit The trigger circuit[2] consists of a capacitor, which will siphon 
charge from the nearby victim wires as they transition between digital values. It essentially 
performs the analog integration of charge from a viable victim wire and is also able to 
reset itself through natural charge leakage. When enough charge is stored and the 
voltage across the capacitor is above a predefined threshold voltage, trigger circuit is 
activated. 
 
Figure 2. 3 Trigger Circuit and Voltage build up across the capacitor 
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Voltage accumulated across the capacitor during every positive half of ‘Clk’ signal shown 
above is: 
 
Besides, there are two important parameters of charge accumulation-based trigger circuit: 
1. Charge Accumulation: Every time victim wire toggles, voltage across the 
capacitor increases by some amount. As soon as the voltage is above a predefined 
threshold voltage, trigger is activated, and payload is deployed. The time taken to 
fully activate the trigger circuit is knows as Trigger Time. 
2. Charge Leakage: Once the victim wire stops toggling, the charge across the 
capacitor slowly leaks away. Eventually, the voltage across the capacitor falls 
below the threshold. The time taken for the trigger to deactivate once the victim 
wire stops toggling is called as Retention Time. 
 
Figure 2. 4 Trigger Time and Retention Time 
The trigger circuit has to be designed in a way that charge accumulation is stronger 
than the charge leakage. Otherwise, whatever charge will be accumulated during the 
positive half, it will be leaked way during the negative half of ‘Clk’. 
Besides, the trigger circuit should be stealthy, and it should not be activated during the 
normal operation of circuit. The trigger circuit mentioned above is a Single-Stage Trigger 
Circuit as it only takes one victim wire as the trigger input. This has a higher probability of 
getting triggered during the normal operation of the circuit or during the testing phase , 
known as False Trigger Activation. To prevent this, we can combine multiple single-stage 
trigger circuits which has mutually exclusive victim wires as trigger inputs. This would 
make the multi-stage trigger stealthier and more controllable.  
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2.4.2 Multi-Stage Trigger Circuits 
Below are some examples of Multi-Stage Trigger Circuits[2] which is a logical combination 
of two or more single-stage trigger outputs. To understand their operation, we will assume 
that the trigger circuit outputs Logic 0 when trigger is activated. For example, for OR 
based trigger, final trigger is activated when both A and B triggers are activated. In a 
similar fashion, we can use different logic combinations to make complex trigger circuits. 
  
Figure 2. 5 Examples of Multi-Stage Trigger Circuits 
Trigger Input:  
Victim wires serving as a trigger input has to be the ones which has a lower activity rate 
during the normal  operation of the circuit. Such wires are chosen by running several 
benchmark programs keeping in mind the expected workload of the processor. We also 
need to make sure that these low activity wires are easily controllable, and we can 
increase their toggle rate by running our attack programs.  
In this attack[2], a divide-by-zero flag signal is used as a trigger input for single-stage 
attack. It is very unlikely during normal circuit operation to perform divide-by-zero 
operation repeatedly, while it is easy for the attacker to do so. Below is a pseudo program 
for it: 
 
Figure 2. 6 Attack program for a single-stage attack 
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2.4.3 Payload Circuit 
In this attack[2], payload is to deploy a privilege escalation of a user mode process. This 
can be achieved by changing one bit of a Supervision register, SR[0] in the attacked 
processor. Logic 0 denotes user mode and Logic 1 corresponds to supervisor mode. 
Thus, as a payload we change the value of this bit from logic 0 to logic 1 and give a user 
mode process full control over the processor.  
Below is the modification we make to the reset signal path to the SR[0] flip-flop. This is 
an active-low reset, so the output would be logic 1 if reset is logic 0. Since the trigger 
output is 0 when it is activated, we put an AND gate in between the reset pin and the reset 
signal. 
 
Figure 2. 7 Payload circuit 
This payload circuit is also introduced in the unused spaces in the layout along with the 
trigger circuit. 
2.4.4 Design Layout 
Below is the Die micrograph of analog malicious hardware test chip with the inserted 
Trigger: 
• Processor area is 2.1 mm2 
• HT circuitry occupies less than 0.08% of the chip’s area 
 
Figure 2. 8 Die Micrograph 
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Chapter 3. Possible Defenses 
 
It is very challenging to detect Hardware Trojans due to their diversity and unpredictable 
process variations during fabrication. There are various techniques to detect hardware 
trojans, depending upon the type of impact trojans have on the original circuit. Below 
listed are a few techniques used to detect Trojans: 
1. IC Fingerprinting/Side Channel Analysis: Uses side channel information like 
changes in power, temperature, delay profile of a chip and compare it to a golden 
reference chip to detect anomalous behavior. 
 
2. Built-In Self Authentication (BISA): Replace the unused spaces in the placed & 
routed design by functional filler cells. 
 
3. Split IC Manufacturing: Divide the chip into two parts. Send one part to be 
fabricated in a trusted fabrication house[8] and the other to a less trustworthy 
fabrication house. 
3.1 Path Delay Fingerprinting 
Determine the presence of a Hardware Trojan based upon the changes in path delay[6] 
of various paths in the design. There are a number of delay paths in the chip. This 
technique proposes that even if the inserted trojan is small compared to the rest of the 
chip, it has a significant impact on path delay and it can be detected. The testing 
procedure comprises of three steps: 
1. Path Delay gathering of Nominal chips: Several chips are selected, and a high 
number of input test patterns are applied to it. The delay information of various 
paths is calculated. Then, the chips are reverse engineered by chip delayering and 
scanning them with a scanning electron microscope to ensure that the chips are 
genuine. 
 
2. Fingerprint generation: By gathering the path delay information, a series of delay 
fingerprints are generated. 
 
3. Trojan detection: Similar test patterns are applied to the rest of the chips and in 
a similar fashion, their delay fingerprints are obtained. These fingerprints are then 
compared to the delay fingerprints[6] of genuine chips. If there is a difference 
above a pre-defined threshold, the chip is labeled as malicious. 
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Below is one example[6] of a hardware trojan which increases the path delay of the 
mentioned path in the chip: 
 
Figure 3. 1 Trojan Circuit Example 
In the above example, ideally the BUS_SEL signal was determined by Logical AND of 
CTRL & INT signal. But due to the inserted trojan circuitry, the path delay increases. The 
trigger actively monitors the control signal and instruction interrupt signal. When both the 
CTRL & INT signals are logic 0, payload is activated and BUS_SEL signal gets reversed. 
This leads to the selection of wrong signal for inner computations. 
3.2 Built-In Self Authentication (BISA) 
A lot of fabrication time attacks leverage the empty spaces in the layout of a chip which 
are filled with dummy logic, also called as non-functional filler cells. Replacing these filler 
cells do not impact the functionality of the design and thus, provide a room for the 
attackers to insert the trojan circuitry. 
This is a novel technique[9] to prevent hardware trojan insertion. The idea is to replace 
all the unused spaces in the layout of the design with functional filler cells. These filler 
cells, known as BISA cells are connected to each other to form a combinational circuit. 
This circuit is not connected to the original circuit and they never work simultaneously. 
Several input patterns are applied to this combinational circuit to obtain a digital signature. 
If any of the BISA cells are replaced by the attacker, the digital signature changes and 
hence, we can detect the presence of a trojan. 
3.2.1 BISA Structure 
BISA circuitry consists of three parts: 
1. BISA Circuit Under Test: After the unused spaces are filled with BISA cells, these 
BISA cells are connected to each other to form a combinational logic. Instead of 
connecting all the cells together as one big combinational circuit, several small 
combinational circuits are formed, known as BISA blocks. This is done to increase 
the stuck-at-fault test coverage. Each BISA block operates independently.  
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2. Test Pattern Generator (TPG): It generates a number of N-bit test patterns which 
are shared by all the M BISA blocks. Here, it is implemented as a Linear Feedback 
Shift Register. 
3. Output Response Analyzer (ORA): Each BISA block outputs a 1-bit response 
and thus, M BISA blocks generate a M-bit response. This M-bit response acts as 
an input to the ORA and ORA generates a digital signature. 
 
Figure 3. 2 BISA Structure 
3.2.2 Operating Modes in a design with BISA 
There are two operating modes[9] present in a design with BISA. 
 
Figure 3. 3 Operating modes 
Normal Mode: In  the normal operating mode, BISA circuit is completely shutdown by 
disabling clocks to LFSR and MISR. The original circuit works normally as it should and 
BISA do not affect its functionality. 
Authentication Mode: It comprises of two different modes: 
• Test Mode: LFSR generates N-bit test pattern which are shared by M BISA blocks 
at every clock cycle. At the same time, each BISA block outputs a 1-bit response. 
Thus, the MISR receives M bits from M blocks. We apply the test patterns for a 
certain number of clock cycles. After applying sufficient number of test patterns, 
BISA circuit can be fully tested and BISA stops. The vector stored in the MISR is 
the obtained digital signature. We compare the obtained signature to the signature 
from the simulations. If they are different, we can deduce the presence of a trojan. 
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• Shift Mode: All registers in LFSR and MISR are connected in series in the shift 
mode. This is done so that the signature in the MISR can be shifted out and new 
seed for LFSR can be shifted in at the same time.  
3.2.3 BISA Insertion Flow 
There are some steps[9] that need to be followed for inserting BISA circuitry into the 
design: 
 
Figure 3. 4 BISA Insertion Flow 
 
1. Preprocessing: We need to get the location of each standard cell in the design 
and also their length & width. This will help determining the coordinates of four 
corners of each standard cell.  
2. Identifying unused spaces: A physical design tool like Synopsys IC compiler can 
generate a DEF file (.def) that contains the coordinates of all placed standard cells. 
Once we have the coordinates of the four corners of standard cells, we can obtain 
the locations of unused spaces in the layout. 
3. BISA Cells Placement: A greedy algorithm is used for inserting BISA cells in the 
layout. We start with the largest cell in the library and try to insert it in the unused 
spaces. If any unused space is smaller than the size of biggest cell, we move to 
next biggest cell and try to fit it in. Similarly, we keep on moving towards the 
smallest cell available in the library until we fill all the unused spaces in the layout. 
Since, we insert even the smallest cell available in the library, there won’t be any 
room left for inserting any additional circuitry because inserted trojan has to be 
standard cell compatible.  
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4. BISA Cells Routing: Once all the BISA cells are placed, we need to connect them 
together to form BISA blocks. We try to keep the minimum number of gates in 
every BISA block to improve the test coverage.  
 
Below figure depicts BISA cells insertion and placement[9]: 
 
Figure 3. 5 Cells Insertion and Placement  
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Chapter 4.  Can these Defenses detect Example Attack? 
 
4.1 Side Channel Information (Power/Temperature) 
The trojan circuitry used in our Example Attack is very small and its impact on the power 
consumption of the entire design is buried within the normal fluctuations in the power 
consumption of chip. This can be seen from the below table which depicts the power 
consumption of chip when certain benchmark programs are run on it. As you can see, the 
power consumption when the Single-stage and Two-stage is activated is very similar to 
when other benchmark programs are run. Such a small amount can be attributed to the 
normal fluctuations in the power consumption. 
 
Table 4. 1 Chip Power Consumption  
Besides, for detection based on temperature tracking, assumption is that the temperature 
of the chip rises dramatically when the trojan is activated. However, in case of Example 
Attack, the charge in the capacitor is gradually accumulated and payload lasts for a short 
duration of time. Thus, rate of thermal variation is very low and cannot be detected by 
methods looking for a dramatic change in temperature profile of the chip. 
4.2 Path Delay Fingerprinting 
Because the trigger circuit in our Example Attack is small, it does not load the victim wire 
a lot. Thus, the timing perturbation due to the trojan insertion is masked by the noise 
present in the delay path. 
4.3 Split IC Manufacturing 
This technique is based upon dividing the chip in two parts where one part is sent to a 
trusted fabrication house and other to a less trustworthy fabrication house. Our Example 
Attack relies upon the low activity wires and a bit value in the security critical register 
which is used as a trigger input and victim flip-flop respectively. Thus, we can send the 
security critical registers and a bunch of wires including these low activity wires to be 
fabricated in a trusted fabrication house. Though, this would cause a certain cost 
overhead, but it increases the probability of protecting the chip against such attacks.  
P a g e  20 | 23 
 
4.4 BISA 
Our Example Attack is based upon a primary assumption that there will be some unused 
spaces in the design layout which are filled with dummy logic(known as non-functional 
filler cells) and removing those won’t affect the functionality of the design. BISA, however, 
replace these unused spaces with BISA cells which are connected together to form a 
combinational circuit. Replacing any of these BISA cells will change the output signature 
of the BISA circuit and this indicates the presence of a Trojan in the chip. While this 
technique might prevent the Example Attack, it does have some limitations: 
1. Significant area overhead due to the routing of BISA cells 
2. Static leakage through BISA cells in the Idle mode 
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Chapter 5.  Example Attack Review 
 
The Example Attack described in Chapter 2 have some strengths along with some 
shortcomings which are outlined below. 
5.1 Strengths 
• Trojan circuitry is small, consisting of a few transistors and capacitors wrapped in 
a single gate 
• Trigger circuit requires an unlikely sequence to get activated, which very rarely 
happens during normal operation or testing 
• Hidden from Visual/Side-Channel inspection 
• Implemented in Analog Domain so it can evade the digital verification steps 
• Capacitors can naturally reset due to leakage 
5.2 Shortcomings 
 
Table 5. 1 Shortcomings 
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Chapter 6. Conclusion 
 
• While the Example Attack is good in some ways, it is based upon some 
assumptions which might not hold.  
• There is a diverse set of HT’s presents nowadays and there is no technique which 
can detect most or all of the HT attacks. We need a defense that has maximum 
HT detection coverage. We can do so by identifying the common behavior of most 
of the HTs and developing a defense to detect that common behavior. 
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